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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SWEETWATER PROPERTIES, SBC
INVESTMENT COMPANY and
BLACKJACK TRUST,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
Case No. 17064

vs.
TOWN OF ALTA, UTAH, a municipal corporation,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF TOWN OF ALTA IN OPPOSITION TO
SWEETWATER PETITION FOR REHEARING

The Town of Alta, pursuant to Rule 76(e) (2) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, herewith submits its answering Brief in
response to the Petition for Rehearing filed by the Respondents, Sweetwater Properties, et al., in this Case on February
2, 1981.
Any possible doubt surrounding the judicial soundness
and validity of the unanimous Opinion of this Court issued
in this appeal on the 14th day of January, 1981 is entirely
removed by the Petition for Rehearing of the Respondents
(hereafter "Sweet-water").

The Petition for Rehearing not

only mischaracterizes and misreads the Opinion of the Court,
it misstates the substantive law of municipal annexation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

under the newly enacted statutory arrangement set out in
10-2-401, et seq. u.c.A. (Repl. Vol. 2A 1979).
A balanced reading of the Opinion fairly reflects that
it is a studied and accurate legal analysis of the Statutes
on municipal annexation and that under the exigent facts of
the Case at Bar, the right results were reached for the
right reasons.

The Petition for Rehearing has no probative

merit, reurges, in part, questions that have already been
fully briefed and argued, and should be summarily denied.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The contentions of Sweetwater on Rehearing break-out in
three parts:
1.

Under the January 14, 1981 Opinion this Court has

allege~ly

misread and misapplied the annexation Statutes of

Utah to hold that there is only one method of municipal
annexation and that such can now be accomplished, under the

1979 Legislation, with or without the acquiescence or
desires of the property owner.

Sweetwater argues on Rehear-

ing that contrary to such alleged view by this Court, the
only methodology for municipal annexation is through or in
conjunction with a voluntary petition for annexation filed

by a landowner(s) under the purported auspices of 10-2-416
(Repl. Vol. - 2A-1979) •.
Even were this allegation of Sweetwater a legally sound
interpretation (which it is manifestly not) of the annexation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Statutes of this State, it remains a mystery how such
interpretation cuts in favor of Sweetwater under the factual
merits of the Case so as to justify a plenary rehearing.
Nonetheless, Alta does not demur to the legal argument of
Sweetwater but will answer the same.
2.

That Salt Lake County Service Area No. 3 and Salt Lake

City were "affected entities" requiring full written notice
of the Alta Policy Declaration adopted on September 13, 1979.
This issue has already been fully briefed and argued by the
parties as well as closely examined by the Court in its
January 14, 1981 Opinion.

The rule is well recognized in

this Jurisdiction that the reargument of questions that have
been fairly and fully decided in the main Opinion will not
be reviewed and answered a second time on rehearing.
Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619 (1912}.
3.

That contrary to the Opinion of the Court, the pur-

ported "vested property rights" of Sweetwater in and to the
zoning and building regulations of Salt Lake County vis-a-vis
the Policy Declaration of Alta were fully and constitutionally
ripe under the facts of the Case.
Although extended examination is quite unnecessary to
answer the arguments of Sweetwater, contentions 1 and 3 will
be briefly treated.

Argument 2 of Sweetwater is impaled both

substantively and-procedurally by examination in the main
appeal and will not be repetitively reexamined for the second
time in this Brief.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS COURT WAS CLEARLY CORRECT IN ITS
CONCLUSION THAT THE ANNEXATION STATUTES OF
1979 ANTICIPATE THAT UNOPPOSED MUNICIPAL
ANNEXATION MAY TAKE PLACE WITHOUT THE CONSENT
OF THE ABUTTING AND AFFECTED PROPERTY OWNER.
1.

Controlling Law on Rehearing.

The claim is made by Sweetwater in its Petition for
Rehearing that the unanimous Opinion of this Court filed on
January 14, 1981 misconstrued the 1979 Utah Annexation
Statute and invented a new proposition of law enabling a
municipality to annex against the consent of the affected
1/
landowner.- In principal part such Sweetwater contention
2/
was urged in the main Appeal.As noted above, Sweetwater is not entitled to a second
debate on rehearing to reurge issues that have already been
fairly submitted and cited.

In the watershed case of Cummings

v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619 (1912) this Court
declared as the controlling law:

1/

See Sweetwater- J>~t_ition for Rehearing pp. 4-8.

~

Sweetwater Brief on Appeal pp. 9-16, 42-44.

-4-
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"In this case nothing was done or attempted
by counsel, except to reargue the very proposition we had fully considered and decided.
If we should write opinions on all the Petitions for Rehearings filed, we would have to
devote a very large portion of our time in
answering counsel's contentions a second
time; and if we should grant rehearings because they are demanded, we should do nothing
else save to write and rewrite opinions in a
few cases."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Anderson v. Knox,
300 F.2d 296 (9 Cir. 1962) put the issue in a more laconic
manner when it observed:
"It is obvious from the statements in the
affidavit that appellant plans, under the
guise of a petition for rehearing, to study
and reargue the case anew. Such is not the
proper function of a petition for rehearing,
and an attempt to do as suggested is an abuse
of the privilege of making such a petition.
Furthermore, such efforts are ill-advised and
self-defeating." 300 F.2d at 297.
The Opinion of January 14, 1981 treating the issue of
involuntary annexation of private property by a municipality
was squarely raised by the Sweetwater Brief in the main
Appeal. It is unentitled to march across the same ground a
second time on rehearing.

To that end, the Petition for

Rehearing should be denied.
2.

This Court Correctly Determined That the New Annexation

Statute Envisions Involuntary Municipal Annexation of Private
Property.
The flawed argtiment of Sweetwater is that 10-2-416, providing for a voluntary petition by landowner for annexation, is
the sine qua non of all annexation under the 1979 Legislation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and that without a voluntary petition being filed by a majority
of affected real property owners having at least one-third of
the real property value, annexation may not be a legally
accomplished fact.

The trouble with that argument is they read

Section 416 with myopic tunnel vision to the exclusion of the
other substantive sections of the 1979 annexation Legislation
and specifically 10-2-414, 415, 417 and 418 as well as the
public policy proclamation set out in Section 401.
In point of fact, the recent annexation Statutes cited
above, read in juxtaposition (along with Section 416), contemplates three methods in which municipal annexation may be
accomplished.

Besides the traditional method of annexation

under a petition signed by a majority of property owners having
one-third of the value (as set out in Section 10-2-416), 10-2-414
and 415 contemplates annexation by a municipality of abutting
property without the consent and, perhaps, contrary to the
desires of the property owner(s).

That conclusion is all

but axiomatic under an even-handed reading of 10-2-414 which
provides, in substance, that a municipality, "on its own
initiative" may adopt a policy declaration in conformance
with particular requirements.

Such declaration, under 10-2-414

would serve as a basis for an ordinance of annexation provided
there is no

pr~t~st

filed by an affected entity or a written

notice and objection of the affected landowner under 10-2-418.
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Following such procedure and upon a certified copy of
the annexation ordinance being filed with the County Recorder:
"* * * the annexation shall be deemed and
held to be part of the annexing municipality,
and the inhabitants thereof shall enjoy the
privileges of the annexing municipality."
10-2-415 U.C.A. (Repl. Vol. 2A 1979).

Such methodology provides, a procedure on its own,
without relationship to the Statute 10-2-414 upon which
Sweetwater's argument hangs and falls.
But the landowner, as noted by this Court at page 4 of
the Slip Opinion, is not without recourse.

If a landowner

is in the midst of urban property development, objects to
the municipal policy declaration to annexation, and his
property comes within one-half mile of the municipality, the
annexation process falls under a third methodology and is
3/
subject to the provisions of 10-2-418.- That Statute is
directly germane to this Case.

Under Section 418, the owner

may raise by written notice all legal and factual defenses
"preventing an annexation to the municipality" after a
policy declaration has once issued by the City.

The landowner

thereafter has 12 months from the filing of his written notice
to negotiate in good faith and diligence the issues surrounding annexation.

1J

If an understanding has not been reached at

If the property:Owiler objects but his land is not within one-half
mile of the municipal boundaries, his remedy is objection before
the municipal body under the hearing procedures of 10-2-414 and
415. Slip Opinion of January 14, 1981.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the end of 12 months, property development may thereafter go
forward as permitted by law.

As this Court noted in its Slip

Opinion p. 4, Sweetwater gave no written notice of its objection to the Alta Policy Declaration and desire to annex and
undertook no negotiations at all, much less in good faith and
diligence, to accomplish the annexation "in accordance with
the legislative policies".

Sweetwater can hardly claim that

it is aggrieved when all that Alta did in this Case was to
file a policy declaration in substantial compliance with
10-2-414 which, in turn, invoked the provisions of 10-2-418.
A rational construction of the annexation policy set out in
the 1979 Legislation under 10-2-401 et seq. supports fully the
annexation procedural methodology described above and the Court
in its January 14·, 1981 Opinion so held.
The attempt upon the part of Sweetwater to read 10-2-416
as the sole litmus for any annexation under the 1979 Legislation
is to ignore the plain legislative policy, and, in fact, would
emasculate the pragmatic basis for a municipal policy declaration of· annexation as plainly contemplated by 10-2-414, 415,
and 418 in the first instance; indeed, those sections of the
annexation chapter would be rendered moot.

This Court has

let it be known heretofore that it will not assume that the
Legislature was engaged in idle penmanship in the construction
of a

compreh~nsive

enactment.

Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews,

Inc., 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P.2d 223 (1967); Howe v. Jackson,
18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159 (1966).
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The point of and answer to Sweetwater's argument on
Rehearing is that 10-2-416 provides a method for municipal
annexation upon petition by landowners.

It simply inculcates

the remnants of the earlier statute on the subject so that
annexation may be pursued voluntarily at the option of landowners having a majority of the subject real property and
one-third of its value.

It is, however, an illogical non-

sequitur to contend, as does Sweetwater herein, that 10-2-416
is the only method of municipal annexation and that voluntary,
landowner petition is a statutory condition precedent to
municipal annexation.

That tortured construction reads 10-

2-414, 415, 417 and 418, as well as the legislative policy
of 10-2-401 out of the Statute books.

10-2-416 says no more

and no less than a voluntary petition for annexation, but for
the exception of island and peninsula annexation under 10-1-420,
shall meet the majority and value requirements of Section 416.
The argument of Sweetwater is deficient in law presently
as it was in the main appeal and should be swiftly rejected
in this Rehearing.
3.

The Flawed Argument of Sweetwater is, in All Events,

to No Avail.
Even were Sweetwater to be granted its contention for
the sheer sake of academic argument, it would not salvage its
bankrupt positiori-on rehearing.

The facts are clear that the

only action undertaken by Alta was the execution and enactment
of a Policy Declaration relative to the Sweetwater property
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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on September 13, 1979.

Sweetwater took no steps, under 10-2-

418, to object to the Policy Declaration or to negotiate with
Alta regarding the beneficial facets of annexation.

Such was

noted by this Court in its Slip Opinion, page 4, of January
14, 1981.

Ergo, Sweetwater is without standing to argue its

position on rehearing without attacking the constitutional
validity of 10-2-414, 415 and 418.

As this Court correctly

noted, Sweetwater declined to and never made such constitutional
attack.
POINT II.
THIS COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT ANY
CLAIM OF SWEETWATER AS TO VESTED RIGHTS UNDER
SALT LAKE COUNTY ZONING AND BUILDING REGULATIONS
WERE IMMATURE AND NOT PROPERLY PRESENTED.
Sweetwater argues on rehearing that its alleged constitutional guarantees to develop their property within Alta under
the latter's Policy Declaration pursuant to the same zoning,
density, and use ordinances and regulations as existed in
Salt Lake County was fully mature in this appeal.

The facts

of the matter belie that contention.
Sweetwater commenced the instant litigation in the
District Court three days before the Alta Policy Declaration
was adopted on September 13, 1979.

Sweetwater made no show-

ing at trial that--it either had any constitutional vested
rights to develop their property in a particular fashion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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within Alta or that they had been denied by Alta any such
rights.

Indeed, that was the record in the matter for Sweet-

water had made no attempt, whatsoever, to either negotiate
with Alta or to seek a determination as to the nature and
extent of high-density condominium development within the
territorial boundaries of Alta.

Rather, what the record does

manifest is that Sweetwater filed its action in District Court
three days before Alta even adopted its Policy Declaration on
September 13, 1979 claiming that the Policy Declaration was
void, unenforceable and denied to Sweetwater its property
rights without just compensation.
Thus, on appeal from the District Court decision, this
Court could not reach the issue of any alleged constitutionally
protected rights of property development, for the Alta Policy
Declaration, in its broadest scope, had not passed on much
less denied any claims or alleged rights to property development.
It is hardly surprising that this Court should find that
the issue of any alleged constitutional and vested property
rights of development were not justiciable in this matter.
Such questions were not mature on the main appeal and they
surely are not on rehearing.

C 0 N C L U S I 0 N
The Petition for Rehearing of Sweetwater in this Case is
ill-fated and must be rejected.

Most of its argument is
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repetitive of the main Appeal and does not raise issues that
were either unresolved or raised for the first time in the
January 14, 1981 Opinion of the Court.

A petition for rehear-

ing is not a ceremonial formality for a disenchanted litigant.
The proposition advanced by Sweetwater that annexation,
under the 1979 Utah annexation Legislation may only take
place upon a voluntary petition being filed by concerned
property owners having a quantified property value places
such strain upon the legislative policy of 10-2-401 et seq.,
as well as ordinary commonsense that it literally reads out
of existence the public predicate for a municipal policy
declaration of annexation under 10-2-414 and 415.
This Court reached a sound and fully supported decision
in its Opinion of January 14, 1981.

The Petition for Rehear-

ing of Sweetwater to review that Opinion, should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,

~~~~
ROBERTS. C
~JR.

12th Floor
Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Town of Alta in Opposition to Sweetwater Petition
for Rehearing were served on counsel of record at the
respective addresses indicated, by mailing said copies to
their offices, first class mail, postage prepaid, this
20th day of February, 1981:

E. Craig Smay, Esq.
BERMAN & GIAUQUE
P.O. Box 2670
Park City, UT 84060
Kent s. Lewis, Esq.
DEPUTY SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
151 East 2100 South
Building 4
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
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